Re: Countering the Politics of Fear (was Tariq Ali at UCLA today)
On Oct 28, 2006, at 9:20 PM, Yoshie Furuhashi wrote:
But you fit into the category well and express its tendency toward the politics of fear, depending on topics.
Does the Iranian-American socialist-feminist Val Moghadam count as a
western leftist? This all seems very persuasive to me.
On the Recent Elections in Iran
Val Moghadam
Iranian elections can be full of surprises - or can they? Was the
election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unpredictable or part of a pattern?
Mohammad Khatami’s landslide victories in 1997 and 2001 were won on a
reformist campaign, and his presidency — along with a majority
reformist parliament — raised expectations of social transformation
and political change. But when the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, and the Council of Guardians blocked reform, the movement
lost its momentum and citizens became disillusioned or angry.
Municipal elections brought in a conservative majority, as did the
February 2004 parliamentary elections. In the run-up to the recent
presidential elections, the reformists’ choice had been Mostafa Moin,
but he did not receive enough votes in the first round. After that,
everyone was sure that former president and “pragmatic conservative”
Hashemi Rafsanjani would win. Indeed, many reformists decided to back
Rafsanjani, leading to spirited debates among liberals and reformists
in Iran and in the diaspora as to whether this was the correct tactic
or not. But instead of a victory on the part of the rich and well-
connected Rafsanjani with a daughter widely known as a feminist
(former parliamentarian Faezeh Hashemi), it was Ahmadinejad who won
in the run-off.
Voter turn-out was lower than in the past, and many citizens
boycotted the elections altogether. Boycotting elections is one way
that Iranian citizens show their lack of confidence in the system -
and the Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi announced that she too was
joining the boycott. Perhaps close to 40% of eligible voters did not
cast their ballots in the recent elections. The feeling for many is
that as long as the Council of Guardians remains on the scene to vet
candidates, the whole process is compromised, and “Islamic democracy”
Iranian-style is either a pipe-dream or a highly managed form of
democracy. In the run-off, the choice between Rafsanjani and
Ahmadinejad seemed for many to be far too limited (rather like the
choice between a Republican and a Democrat in the United States). And
so many citizens who desperately want reform of the system did not
vote. Those who did, voted for Ahmadinejad because he put the
spotlight on something that both Rafsanjani and reformists have
neglected: the country’s socio-economic problems, including high
unemployment and an absurdly inflated housing market.
This underscores the main deficit in the reform movement: in classic
liberal fashion, the emphasis has been placed on civil and political
liberties while socio-economic conditions and rights have been
marginalized. As important as it is to argue for removal of social
restrictions on dress and recreation, these issues may be most
pertinent to the well-off in northern Tehran rather than to those who
struggle to find jobs and housing. Issues of social justice were
never very important to the reform movement, and now they have been
hijacked by Ahmadinejad.
In the past, women and youth were Khatami’s main constituents and
indeed the major social base of the reform movement. They are now the
main losers. Iran’s feminist movement may have recognized this threat
when its leaders organized an historic demonstration outside the
gates of Tehran University on 13 June. They were protesting the
disqualification of women candidates from the election, but their
fundamental grievance is with a constitution that limits their role
to that of mothers — and not as workers or political actors — and
rules out their self-determination. Ahmadinejad may not be the
monster that some of the (largely U.S.) press makes him out to be,
but he is a religious conservative and a moralist. Whether he can
overturn the cultural liberalization of the Khatami era is unclear,
but certainly he will not expand it. Whether he can succeed in
addressing the country’s socio-economic problems is also doubtful,
given that he is located squarely within the political establishment,
if not its economic elite.
Marxists understand class conflict well (and some of the liberal
reformists would have done well to draw on the insights of their past
Marxism), but even so, cross-class alliances are possible and
desirable, as well as very much part of Iran’s collective action
repertoire. If Iran’s reform movement is to be revived, it needs to
develop a platform that includes a holistic agenda for social
transformation - one that will resonate with middle-class, working-
class, rich and low-income women and men alike. This means that along
with our insistence that mandatory hejab be rescinded and family law
reformed, that young people be allowed to listen to music and dance,
that all political prisoners be released and civil liberties
established - we need to establish the concept of the socio-economic
rights of citizens, and insist that the redistribution of the
country’s wealth, through an economic policy based on social justice
and human rights, should be the priority of any government.
Val Moghadam is a former professor of sociology and director of
women’s studies at Illinois State University who currently works in
Paris.