Iraq: bleaker than ever
Washington Post - November 28, 2006
Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker
By Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks Washington Post Staff Writers
The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in
western Iraq or counter al-Qaeda’s rising popularity there, according
to newly disclosed details from a classified Marine Corps
intelligence report that set off debate in recent months about the
military’s mission in Anbar province.
The Marines recently filed an updated version of that assessment that
stood by its conclusions and stated that, as of mid-November, the
problems in troubled Anbar province have not improved, a senior U.S.
intelligence official said yesterday. “The fundamental questions of
lack of control, growth of the insurgency and criminality” remain the
same, the official said.
The Marines’ August memo, a copy of which was shared with The
Washington Post, is far bleaker than some officials suggested when
they described it in late summer. The report describes Iraq’s Sunni
minority as “embroiled in a daily fight for survival,” fearful of
“pogroms” by the Shiite majority and increasingly dependent on al-
Qaeda in Iraq as its only hope against growing Iranian dominance
across the capital.
True or not, the memo says, “from the Sunni perspective, their
greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris
have been marginalized.” Moreover, most Sunnis now believe it would
be unwise to count on or help U.S. forces because they are seen as
likely to leave the country before imposing stability.
Between al-Qaeda’s violence, Iran’s influence and an expected U.S.
drawdown, “the social and political situation has deteriorated to a
point” that U.S. and Iraqi troops “are no longer capable of
militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar,” the assessment
found. In Anbar province alone, at least 90 U.S. troops have died
since Sept. 1.
The Post first reported on the memo’s existence in September, as it
was being circulated among military and national security officials.
Several officials who read the report described its conclusions as grim.
But the contents have not previously been made public. Read as a
complete assessment, it paints a stark portrait of a failed province
and of the country’s Sunnis — once dominant under Saddam Hussein –
now desperate, fearful and impoverished. They have been increasingly
abandoned by religious and political leaders who have fled to
neighboring countries, and other leaders have been assassinated. And
unlike Iraq’s Shiite majority, or Kurdish groups in the north, the
Sunnis are without oil and other natural resources. The report notes
that illicit oil trading is providing millions of dollars to al-Qaeda
while “official profits appear to feed Shiite cronyism in Baghdad.”
As a result, “the potential for economic revival appears to be
nonexistent” in Anbar, the report says. The Iraqi government,
dominated by Iranian-backed Shiites, has not paid salaries for Anbar
officials and Iraqi forces stationed there. Anbar’s resources and its
ability to impose order are depicted as limited at best.
“Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government
institutions from the village to provincial levels have disintegrated
or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by Al Qaeda in
Iraq,” or a smattering of other insurgent groups, the report says.
The five-page report — written by Col. Peter Devlin, a senior and
seasoned military intelligence officer with the Marine Expeditionary
Force — is marked secret, for dissemination to U.S. and allied
troops in Iraq only. It does not appear to have been made available
to Iraqi national forces fighting alongside Americans.
The report, “State of the Insurgency in Al-Anbar,” focuses on
conditions in the province that is home to 1.25 million Iraqis, most
of whom live in violence-ridden towns such as Fallujah, Haditha, Hit,
Qaim and Ramadi.
Devlin wrote that attacks on civilians rose 57 percent between
February and August of this year. “Although it is likely that attack
levels have peaked, the steady rise in attacks from mid-2003 to 2006
indicates a clear failure to defeat the insurgency in al-Anbar.”
Devlin suggested that without the deployment of an additional U.S.
military division — 15,000 to 20,000 troops — plus billions of
dollars in aid to the province, “there is nothing” U.S. troops “can
do to influence” the insurgency.
He described al-Qaeda in Iraq as the “dominate organization of
influence in al-Anbar,” surpassing all other groups, the Iraqi
government and U.S. troops “in its ability to control the day-to-day
life of the average Sunni.”
Al-Qaeda itself, now an “integral part of the social fabric of
western Iraq,” has become so entrenched, autonomous and financially
independent that U.S. forces no longer have the option “for a
decapitating strike that would cripple the organization,” the report
says. That is why, it says, the death of al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in June “had so little impact on the structure and
capabilities of al-Qaeda,” especially in Anbar province.
The senior intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of
anonymity because of the sensitivity of his work, said yesterday that
he largely agrees with Devlin’s assessment, except that he thinks it
overstates the role of al-Qaeda in the province. “We argue that it is
a major element in Anbar, but it is not the largest or most dominant
group,” he said.
In a final section of the report, titled “Way Ahead,” Devlin outlined
several possibilities for bringing stability to the area, including
establishing a Sunni state in Anbar, creating a local paramilitary
force to protect Sunnis and to offset Iranian influence, shifting
local budget controls, and strengthening a committed Iraqi police
force that has “proven remarkably resilient in most areas.”
Devlin ended the assessment by saying that while violence has surged,
the presence of U.S. troops in Anbar has had “a real suppressive
effect on the insurgency.” He said the suffering of “Anbar’s citizens
undoubtedly would be far worse now if it was not for the very
effective efforts” of U.S. forces.
The Marine Corps headquarters had no comment on the August report or
the updated assessment, Lt. Col. Scott J. Fazekas, a spokesman, said
yesterday.
Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.