Chomsky
gotta run & do a radio show, but here’s the cite on the Chomsky
article and its opening grafs:
New Left Review I/187, May-June 1991 JOSHUA COHEN AND JOEL ROGERS KNOWLEDGE, MORALITY AND HOPE: THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF NOAM CHOMSKY
In his first published essay on politics, Noam Chomsky announced his
conviction that ‘[i]t is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak
the truth and to expose lies.’ [1] Acting on that conviction, Chomsky
has long supplemented his work in linguistics with writing on
contemporary political affairs, focusing principally on the politics
of the Middle East, the immorality of us foreign policy, and the role
of American mass media and intellectuals in disguising and
rationalizing that policy. [2] By contrast with his work in
linguistics, which is principally theoretical, Chomsky’s political
writings in the main address more straightforwardly factual
questions. As he emphasizes, these can be settled without special
methods or training, and their significance can be appreciated
through the application of common-sense norms and beliefs (for
example, that aggression is wrong, concentrated power is dangerous,
and citizens have greater responsibility for the policies of their
own country than for those of other states), as aided by ‘a bit of
open-mindedness, normal intelligence, and healthy scepticism.’ [3]
The characteristic focus, intensity and hopefulness of Chomsky’s
political writings, however, reflect a set of more fundamental views
about human nature, justice and social order that are not simple
matters of fact. This article explores these more fundamental ideas,
the central elements in Chomsky’s social thought. We begin (section
i) by sketching the relevant features of Chomsky’s conception of
human nature. We then examine his libertarian social ideals (section
ii), and views on social stability and social evolution (section
iii), both of which are animated by this conception of our nature.
To anticipate what follows, we take Chomsky’s social views to be
marked by four key claims: (1) human beings have a ‘moral nature’ and
a fundamental interest in autonomy; (2) these basic features of our
nature support a libertarian socialist social ideal; (3) the interest
in autonomy and the moral nature of human beings help to explain
certain important features of actual social systems, including for
example the use of deception and force to sustain unjust conditions,
as well as their historical evolution; and (4) these same features of
human nature provide reasons for hope that the terms of social order
will improve from a moral point of view. Thus stated, these four
claims are clearly neither concrete nor precise. But neither are they
vacuous. They provide what we take to be a distinctive, optimistic
perspective on human beings and human possibilities. The exposition
that follows aims principally at a sympathetic clarification of this
perspective. While our discussion is often critical, the criticisms
themselves are intended to clarify Chomsky’s views and to underscore
deeper points of agreement with them.
Before turning to that discussion, however, a cautionary remark about
the character and self-conception of Chomsky’s work in this area is
in order. Most important, Chomsky does not have a theory of society
or justice, in the sense of a clearly elaborated and defended set of
fundamental principles. In fact, he believes that significant
progress in ethical and social inquiry requires a systematic theory
of human nature, something that does not now (and may never) exist,
[4] and that in the absence of such a theory social and ethical
thought must rely on relatively speculative and imprecise ideas
(‘guesses, hopes, expectations’ [5]). Moreover, Chomsky denies any
originality for his social and ethical views, identifying himself as
a merely ‘derivative fellow traveller’ [6] in the anarchist and
libertarian socialist traditions.
Finally, and no doubt in part owing to his conviction that his social
and ethical views are neither systematically developed nor original,
Chomsky presents those views in an occasional and sketchy fashion.
Almost always announced as speculative, and often advanced only in
response to promptings from interviewers, their presentation commonly
takes the form of quotation from and endorsement of certain views of
other thinkers (for example, Rousseau, Kant, Humboldt and Marx). [7]
Apart from creating natural difficulties for any attempt at
systematic summary, the character of Chomsky’s presentation
underscores the need for caution in reading more into, or expecting
more of, his work in this area than he invites. We hope that we have
heeded our own warning in what follows.