CFR scholar: time to “disengage” from Iraq
reportcallsformilitarydisengagementfromiraq.html?breadcrumb=3D% = 2Fpublication%2Fbytype%2Fnewsrelease%3Fid%3D351> Report Calls for Military Disengagement From Iraq February 7, 2007
Council on Foreign Relations Council Scholar Recommends Policy Shift to Containing Conflict
[full report: afterthesurge.html>] “The United States should…make clear now to the Iraqi government = that, as the results of the anticipated surge become apparent, the = two sides will begin to negotiate a U.S. military disengagement from = Iraq,” says a new Council Special Report. “The proposed military = disengagement would not be linked to benchmarks that the Iraqi = government is probably incapable of fulfilling….The U.S. drawdown = should not be hostage to Iraqi performance.” The report’s author, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle = Eastern Studies Steven N. Simon, says the surge is a fait accompli = and its results will be known very soon: “the surge is going to take = place regardless of public or congressional opposition. Thus, the = issue is what happens after the surge. Since General David Petraeus = has said that he expects the results of the surge to become apparent = quickly, the ‘day after’ realities should be thought through now.” “The United States has already achieved all that it is likely to = achieve in Iraq: the removal of Saddam, the end of the Ba’athist = regime, the elimination of the Iraqi regional threat, the snuffing = out of Iraq’s unrequited aspiration to weapons of mass destruction, = and the opening of a door, however narrow, to a constitutionally- = based electoral democracy,” says the report, After the Surge: The = Case for U.S. Military Disengagement From Iraq.”Staying in Iraq can = only drive up the price of these gains in blood, treasure, and = strategic position.” Disengagement “would entail withdrawing the bulk of American forces = from Iraq within twelve to eighteen months (that is to say, over the = course of calendar year 2008); shifting the American focus to = containment of the conflict and strengthening the U.S. military = position elsewhere in the region; and engaging Iraq’s neighbors, = including Iran and Syria, members of the UN Security Council, and = potential donors in an Iraq stabilization plan,” Simon writes. “The crisis has now moved beyond the capacity of Washington to = control on its own,” says the report. “The United States lacks the = military resources and the domestic and international political = support to master the situation.” And “even if the United States had = the abundant ground forces and reconstruction teams necessary, it is = not clear that the situation in Iraq today is retrievable.” Simon argues that any realistic reckoning for the future will have to = acknowledge “six grim realities:” its remaining political aims via military means.” United States is culpable but not capable=97that is, Washington bears = substantial responsibility for developments within Iraq without the = ability to shape those developments in a positive direction.” chief U.S. rival in the region, Iran.” Afghanistan, a continuing military commitment to Iraq may lead to two = U.S. losses in southwest Asia.” difficult if not impossible to handle another significant contingency = involving ground forces.” disengagement of U.S. forces; it is now just a matter of time.” “The bleak truth remains that the United States is incapable of = restoring Iraq even to the relative stability of the Ba’athist = era…The even bleaker truth is that continued U.S. military = operations on Iraqi territory might well leave Iraqis even worse off. = In that light, for the U.S. government to sacrifice the lives of its = soldiers in the pursuit of an unattainable objective (a stable, = pluralistic Iraq aligned with U.S. interests), or an inappropriate = one (reputation for toughness and reliability) would be the least = morally defensible course that Washington could take.” The United States should: forces from Iraq within twelve to eighteen months, to begin once the = results of the surge become known. Airport, the Green Zone, and access routes that connect them. forces in Iraq needed to protect or relocate vulnerable minority = populations and suppress insurgent activity in the largely Sunni = provinces. military position elsewhere in the region. Plan for humanitarian contingency operations. Refocus on containment of the war in Iraq. Reinforce the U.S. military presence elsewhere in the Persian Gulf = region, for example, Kuwait; explore options for increasing special = operations forces deployed to Jordan; increase the number of = rotational deployments to the region, including joint exercises. UN Security Council, and potential donors in a stabilization plan for = Iraq. refugee flow. group, including Iran and Syria, with an emphasis on control of = borders, management of refugees, economic and technical assistance to = Iraq, and diplomatic support for political reconciliation. humanitarian intervention in the event that violence in Iraq becomes = genocidal. Palestine-Israel impasse by articulating a vision for final status, = and on support for Lebanese sovereignty. “Having staked its prestige on the intervention and failed to achieve = many of its objectives, the United States will certainly pay a price = for military disengagement from Iraq. But if the United States = manages its departure from Iraq carefully, it will not have lost = everything. Rather, the United States will have preserved the = opportunity to recover vital assets that its campaign in Iraq has = imperiled: diplomatic initiative, global reputation, and the well = being and political utility of its ground forces.”