Washington’s friend, Sudan
Los Angeles Times - June 11, 2007
U.S. relies on Sudan despite condemning it The nation accused of aiding the killings in Darfur provides spies in =
Iraq. In return, it gets access in Washington.
By Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writers
WASHINGTON =97 Sudan has secretly worked with the CIA to spy on the =
insurgency in Iraq, an example of how the U.S. has continued to =
cooperate with the Sudanese regime even while condemning its =
suspected role in the killing of tens of thousands of civilians in =
Darfur.
President Bush has denounced the killings in Sudan’s western region =
as genocide and has imposed sanctions on the government in Khartoum. =
But some critics say the administration has soft-pedaled the =
sanctions to preserve its extensive intelligence collaboration with =
Sudan.
The relationship underscores the complex realities of the post-Sept. =
11 world, in which the United States has relied heavily on =
intelligence and military cooperation from countries, including Sudan =
and Uzbekistan, that are considered pariah states for their records =
on human rights.
“Intelligence cooperation takes place for a whole lot of reasons,” =
said a U.S. intelligence official, who like others spoke on condition =
of anonymity when discussing intelligence assessments. “It’s not =
always between people who love each other deeply.”
Sudan has become increasingly valuable to the United States since the =
Sept. 11 attacks because the Sunni Arab nation is a crossroads for =
Islamic militants making their way to Iraq and Pakistan.
That steady flow of foreign fighters has provided cover for Sudan’s =
Mukhabarat intelligence service to insert spies into Iraq, officials =
said.
“If you’ve got jihadists traveling via Sudan to get into Iraq, =
there’s a pattern there in and of itself that would not raise =
suspicion,” said a former high-ranking CIA official familiar with =
Sudan’s cooperation with the agency. “It creates an opportunity to =
send Sudanese into that pipeline.”
As a result, Sudan’s spies have often been in better position than =
the CIA to gather information on Al Qaeda’s presence in Iraq, as well =
as the activities of other insurgent groups.
“There’s not much that blond-haired, blue-eyed case officers from the =
United States can do in the entire Middle East, and there’s nothing =
they can do in Iraq,” said a second former CIA official familiar with =
Sudan’s cooperation. “Sudanese can go places we don’t go. They’re =
Arabs. They can wander around.”
The officials declined to say whether the Mukhabarat had sent its =
intelligence officers into the country, citing concern over the =
protection of sources and methods. They said that Sudan had assembled =
a network of informants in Iraq providing intelligence on the =
insurgency. Some may have been recruited as they traveled through =
Khartoum.
The U.S.-Sudan relationship goes beyond Iraq. Sudan has helped the =
United States track the turmoil in Somalia, working to cultivate =
contacts with the Islamic Courts Union and other militias in an =
effort to locate Al Qaeda suspects hiding there. Sudan also has =
provided extensive cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, =
acting on U.S. requests to detain suspects as they pass through =
Khartoum.
Sudan gets a number of benefits in return. Its relationship with the =
CIA has given it an important back channel for communications with =
the U.S. government. Washington has also used this channel to lean on =
Khartoum over the crisis in Darfur and for other issues.
And at a time when Sudan is being condemned in the international =
community, its counter-terrorism work has won precious praise. The =
U.S. State Department recently issued a report calling Sudan a =
“strong partner in the war on terror.”
Some critics accuse the Bush administration of being soft on Sudan =
for fear of jeopardizing the counter-terrorism cooperation. John =
Prendergast, director of African affairs for the National Security =
Council in the Clinton administration, called the latest sanctions =
announced by Bush last month “window dressing,” designed to appear =
tough while putting little real pressure on Sudan to stop the =
militias it is widely believed to be supporting from killing members =
of tribal settlements in Darfur.
“One of the main glass ceilings on real significant action in =
response to the genocide in Darfur has been our growing relationship =
with authorities in Khartoum on counter-terrorism,” said Prendergast, =
a senior advisor to the International Crisis Group. “It is the single =
biggest contributor to why the gap between rhetoric and action is so =
large.”
In an interview, Sudan’s ambassador to the United States, John Ukec =
Lueth Ukec, suggested that the sanctions could affect his country’s =
willingness to cooperate on intelligence matters. The steps announced =
by Bush include denying 31 businesses owned by the Sudanese =
government access to the U.S. financial system.
The decision to impose financial penalties “was not a good idea,” =
Ukec said. “It diminishes our cooperation. And it makes those who are =
on the extreme side, who do not want cooperation with the United =
States, stronger.”
But White House and U.S. intelligence officials downplayed the =
prospect that the intelligence cooperation would suffer, saying that =
it was in both countries’ interests.
“The No. 1 consideration in imposing stiffer sanctions is that the =
Sudanese government hasn’t stopped the violence there and the people =
continue to suffer,” said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the =
National Security Council. “We certainly expect the Sudanese to =
continue efforts against terrorism because it’s in their own =
interests, not just ours.”
Sudan has its own interests in following the insurgency because =
Sudanese extremists and foreign fighters who pass through the country =
are likely to return and become a potentially destabilizing presence.
Sudan’s lax controls on travel have made it, according to one =
official, a “way station” for Islamist militants not only from North =
Africa, but also from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states.
Some former U.S. intelligence officials said that Sudan’s help in =
Iraq had been of limited value, in part because the country accounts =
for a small fraction of the foreign fighters, mainly at lower levels =
of the insurgency.
“There’s not going to be a Sudanese guy near the top of the Al Qaeda =
in Iraq leadership,” said a former CIA official who operated in =
Baghdad. “They might have some fighters there, but that’s just cannon =
fodder. They don’t have the trust and the ability to work their way =
up. The guys leading Al Qaeda in Iraq are Iraqis, Jordanians and =
Saudis.”
But others say that Sudan’s contributions have been significant =
because Sudanese frequently occupy support positions throughout Arab =
society =97 including in the Iraq insurgency =97 giving them access to =
movements and supply chains.
“Every group needs weapons. Every group needs a meeting place,” said =
another former high-ranking CIA official who oversaw intelligence =
gathering in Iraq. “Sudanese could get involved in the support chain =
or smuggling channels from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.”
A State Department official said Sudan had “provided critical =
information that has helped our counter-terrorism efforts around the =
globe,” but noted that there was an inherent conflict in the =
relationship.
“They have done things that have saved American lives,” the official =
said. “But the bottom line is that they are bombing their people out =
the wazoo [in Darfur]. Dealing with Sudan, it seems like they are =
always playing both ends against the middle.”
The CIA declined to discuss any cooperation with Sudan.
“The agency does not, as a rule, comment on relations with foreign =
intelligence organizations,” CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said.
Ukec, the Sudanese ambassador, said “the details of what we do in =
counter-terrorism are not available for discussions.” But he noted =
that the U.S. State Department “has openly said we are involved in =
countering terrorism,” and that the assistance his country is =
providing “is not only in Sudan.”
In the mid-1990s, the CIA’s relationship with Sudan was severed. At =
the time, Sudan was providing safe harbor for Osama bin Laden and =
other Al Qaeda leaders. But ties were reestablished shortly after the =
Sept. 11 attacks, when the CIA reopened its station in Khartoum.
Initially, the collaboration focused on information Sudan could =
provide about Al Qaeda’s activities before Bin Laden left for =
Afghanistan in 1996, including Al Qaeda’s pursuit of chemical, =
biological or nuclear weapons and its many business fronts and =
associates there.
Since then, Sudan has moved beyond sharing historical information on =
Al Qaeda into taking part in ongoing counter-terrorism operations, =
focusing on areas where its assistance is likely to be most appreciated.
“Iraq,” a U.S. intelligence official said, “is where the intelligence =
is going to have the most impact on Americans.”
In 2005, the CIA sent an executive jet to Sudan to fly the country’s =
intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Salah Abdallah Gosh, to Washington for =
meetings with officials at agency headquarters.
Gosh has not returned to Washington since, but a former official said =
that “there are liaison visits every day” between the CIA and the =
Mukhabarat.