Sara Roy on Hamas (and censorship)
http://mepc.org/journal_vol14/0707_roy.asp
BOOK REVIEW
Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad by
Matthew Levitt. Yale University Press, in cooperation with the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. 324 pages, $26.00,
hardcover.
Sara Roy
Senior research scholar, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard
University
Author’s Note:
This review, published here in its entirety, was originally
commissioned by The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, the official
foreign-policy journal at the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
Between the time I was invited to write the review and the time I was
told it would be published, over two months had passed during which I
had had several exchanges, some of them difficult, with the editorial
staff. However, by the end of the process the editor-in-chief, with
whom I had been working, was pleased with the review, and so was I.
He sent me an e-PDF of the review as it would appear in the journal
(Volume 31:1 Winter 2007). The PDF version of the page proofs
revealed that the editor had excerpted two relevant sentences
(featured in sidebars) to highlight observations that I had offered
in the review:
- “While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
engaged in violence and armed struggle, and has been the primary
force behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt’s
presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
organization to an insular, one-dimensional…entity dedicated solely
to violence…and Israel’s destruction.” - “The ability of Hamas to reinterpret itself over time through
processes of radicalization, de-radicalization, de-militarization,
and re-radicalization is a pronounced and common theme in its
historical evolution.”
During a subsequent exchange the editor-in-chief wrote, “Thank you
for your hard work as well. It’s a good review.” I believed that was
the end of the matter. Just a few days later, I received the
following e-mail message from the same editor-in-chief:
Dear Ms. Roy:
…After careful review and much consideration of the merits of your
piece, we have decided that we are ultimately unable to publish your
review for this edition. Your review was evaluated by several of our
editors and an external editor for objectivity. Unfortunately, they
disagreed with my decision to publish your review for the following
reasons: despite their agreement with many of your points, all
reviewers found the piece one-sided. This one-sidedness dissuaded
readers from reading the piece to the end; ultimately, this last
point is the most important. Although I found your arguments
valuable, if readers consistently feel this way, I am unable to move
forward with a piece. My apologies for the way in which this process
was carried out, and for the time that you spent on editing the
piece. Thank you once again for your submission and your efforts. If
you would like to discuss this further, please feel free to e-mail me.
In more than 20 years of writing and publishing I have never
experienced such behavior or encountered what to me, at least, is so
blatant a case of censorship. I am therefore extremely grateful to
Anne Joyce and Stephen Magro for agreeing to publish the review in
Middle East Policy.
At the beginning of the first Palestinian uprising, I was living in
Gaza and spent much time in the refugee camps interviewing families
about the political and socioeconomic changes taking place around
them. Despite the harsh living situation, Palestinians were filled
with a palpable sense of hope and possibility that has since
evaporated. Hamas was then struggling to create a popular
constituency, despite overwhelming support among Palestinians for
secular nationalism. That was 18 years ago, and neither I nor anyone
else ever thought that Hamas would one day emerge as a major
political actor: democratically winning legislative elections,
defeating the majority Fatah party and heading a Palestinian government.
In his recent book, Matthew Levitt, who is deputy assistant secretary
for intelligence and analysis at the U.S. Department of the Treasury
and an expert in financial counterterrorism, argues that Hamas is
strictly a terrorist organization that is not only a domestic threat
but a global one, a part of an international jihad network with links
to al-Qaeda that must be met with force. He further argues — and this
is the core of his book — that despite the existence of
differentiated political, social and military sectors within Hamas,
they are all part of the same “apparatus of terror.”
Levitt devotes significant attention to attacking the Islamist social
sector (dawa) and Hamas’s charitable institutions. It is the
principle aim of his book to show how Hamas uses its extensive social-
service network-mosques, schools, kindergartens, orphanages,
hospitals, clinics, sports clubs, youth clubs-to further its primary
political agenda, which he claims is the destruction of Israel. He
argues that through its social support structure and services, “Hamas
leverages the appreciation (and indebtedness) it earns through social
welfare activities to garner support — both political and logistical
— for its terrorist activities.” Levitt summarizes his argument as
follows: “The general deprivation of the Palestinian people in the
Israeli-occupied territories predisposes them to favor the much-
needed social support that Hamas provides.” He continues, “In
addition to purchasing goodwill, charities also create a built-in
logistical support umbrella underneath which terrorist operations are
sheltered and operate.” He explains that the dawa network
operationally supports terrorism through recruitment, employment and
financing and by providing institutional legitimacy.
His evidence, at times interesting, particularly with regard to
Hamas’s external sources of financing, is more often than not based
on assumption, extrapolation and generalization. For example, as
evidence for how religious organizations raise money for Palestinian
terrorism, Levitt quotes from a pamphlet produced by a Quranic
memorization center that was sponsored by the Ramallah-al Bireh
charity committee. The pamphlet listed 30 ways to enter heaven,
including “Jihad for the sake of Allah by fighting with one’s soul
and money.”
In another example of how hospitals are used to support terrorism,
Levitt briefly describes the Dar al-Salam Hospital: “According to
information cited by the FBI,” the hospital is considered a Hamas
institution because it was founded with “Hamas funds and protection.”
But Levitt fails to provide any real evidence of these funds or how
and why they are considered “Hamas.” The assumption is that these
ties, even if they are shown to exist, are inherently evil and can be
nothing else.
In a chapter on how the dawa teaches terror and radicalizes
Palestinian society, Levitt writes, “Recipients of Hamas financial
aid or social services are less likely to turn down requests from the
organization such as allowing their homes to serve as safe houses for
Hamas fugitives, ferrying fugitives, couriering funds or weapons,
storing and maintaining explosives, and more.” He cites as evidence
for this sweeping statement one resident of Jabalya refugee camp in
Gaza who fed Hamas militants daily. The possibility that Palestinians
receive support from Hamas institutions without preconditions or that
popular support requires more than the lure of financial incentives
and free social services does not enter Levitt’s argument. Levitt
also claims, “When angry, frustrated or humiliated Palestinians
regularly listen to sermons in mosques in which Jews, Israelis and
even Americans are depicted as enemies of Islam and Palestine,
Hamas’s official policy may not restrain individual enthusiasm.” One
wonders how Mr. Levitt knows these things, given that he appears
never to have stepped inside a Hamas institution in Gaza or the West
Bank or to have conducted any fieldwork at all.
While these arguments are oft-repeated in today’s media, Levitt does
little to address research that supports a very different conclusion
regarding the Hamas dawa. Some of the key findings of this research
point to institutional features that demonstrate no preference for
religion or politics over other ideologies, particularly in
programmatic work; an approach to institutional work that advocates
incrementalism, moderation, order and stability; a philosophical and
practical desire for productivity and professionalism that shuns
radical change and emphasizes community development and civic
restoration over political violence; and no evidence of any formal
attempt to impose an Islamic model of political, social, legal or
religious behavior, or to create an alternative Islamic or Islamist
conception of society.
While there can be no doubt that, since its inception, Hamas has
engaged in violence and armed struggle and has been the primary force
behind the horrific suicide bombings inside Israel, Levitt’s
presentation reduces this increasingly complex and sophisticated
organization to an insular, one-dimensional and seemingly mindless
entity dedicated solely to violence, terrorism and Israel’s
destruction. To fully understand the current political stature of
Hamas, it is necessary to closely examine the dramatic transitions
that have occurred within the organization itself, among Palestinians
with respect to their society, and in Palestine’s relationship with
Israel.
From the point of view of Hamas, Palestine is an Arab and Islamic
land that fell to colonial control with the demise of the Ottoman
Empire. The establishment of the State of Israel is viewed as a way
to perpetuate colonial authority over the Muslim homeland and is
therefore illegitimate. As victims of colonialism, Hamas argues that
Palestinians have the right to resist and struggle to regain their
homeland and freedom, viewing this as a local and nationalist
struggle. Now, almost two decades after its birth, Hamas has grown in
size and popularity. While changes have not been made to its frame of
reference or objectives, its political discourse has become more
refined and streamlined, particularly with regard to its relations
with local groups, political factions, other religious communities
and other nations.
Unfortunately, Matthew Levitt’s book does not address the critical
evolutionary processes — particularly with regard to its
organizational structure and political, social and economic role in
Palestinian society — that have characterized the Palestinian
Islamist movement and Hamas’s rise to power. The ability of Hamas to
reinterpret itself over time through processes of radicalization, de-
radicalization, de-militarization and re-radicalization is a
pronounced and common theme in its historical evolution. Levitt
neglects to address the significance behind this commitment to
reinterpretation. His analysis aims simply to demonize Hamas, and he
discounts the critical connections between changing patterns of
protest and structures of society, competing visions of a Palestinian
social and political order, and contesting Islamic and secular
definitions of meaning and legitimacy. The synergy among these forces
has characterized the history and growth of Palestinian Islamism.
Israel’s military occupation, which has long been the defining
context for Palestinian life, is almost absent from Levitt’s book.
Hamas’s popularity and growing empowerment derive from its role as a
resistance organization, fighting against an occupation that is now
40 years old. Israel’s steady expropriation, fragmentation and
division of Palestinian lands; settlement construction and expansion;
closure restrictions and destruction of the Palestinian economy are
not part of Levitt’s discussion, nor is the right of the Palestinians
to resist these measures. In those few instances where the occupation
is mentioned, it is couched in terms that acknowledge Palestinian
hardship — a reality exploited by Hamas — but justified as a response
to terrorism. In the absence of any serious examination of Israel’s
occupation, Levitt’s portrayal of the rise of Hamas is completely
detached from the context within which it was produced and shaped.
Despite evidence to the contrary, the organization is also described
as a movement incapable of transformation, ignoring the improvements
in Hamas’s political discourse regarding political compromise with
the State of Israel and resolution of the conflict. During the period
of the Oslo peace process, for example, some dramatic changes
occurred within Hamas. The organization was moving away from the
extreme and a position of confrontation towards one that was more
centrist and moderate. This shift was characterized by a
reorientation in policy and strategic emphasis from political/
military action to social works and community development.
Accompanying this shift was a redefinition of the nature of the
Palestinian struggle, which was no longer for political or military
power per se but for defining new social arrangements and appropriate
cultural and institutional models that would meet social needs
without resort to violence. Similarly, the Islamist movement was not
advancing a policy of isolation but was calling for greater
accommodation and cooperation with both domestic and international
actors.
Since Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 legislative elections,
there has been a further evolution in its political thinking — as
evidenced in some of its key political documents — characterized by a
strong emphasis on state-building and programmatic work, greater
refinement with regard to its position on a two-state solution and
the role of resistance, and a progressive de-emphasis on religion.
(See Khaled Hroub, “A ‘New Hamas’ Through Its New Documents,” Journal
of Palestine Studies, 34 (4) (Summer 2006)). These are absent from
Levitt’s discussion. Levitt also overlooks questions that are vital
to any analysis of Hamas, especially at present. To name just a few,
what were Hamas’s ideological, philosophical and structural
boundaries? How and why were they reset and expanded? What is the
role of religion as opposed to politics in Islamist thought and
practice, particularly in the public sphere? Are religion and
politics truly unified? Can Hamas reconcile faith and ideology with a
demand for a place in the political system?
Levitt’s book has many serious flaws and merits a detailed critique
that extends well beyond the scope of this review. His is not a work
of analysis or scholarship, to say the least, and despite certain
points that are interesting and accurate, anyone wishing to gain a
substantive, reasoned and critical understanding of Hamas would do
well to look elsewhere.